Delegation and Due Process by Dripps, Donald A.
DELEGATION AND DUE PROCESS
DONALD A. DRIPPS*
The nondelegation doctrine, first used to strike down a federal stat-
ute in 1935, constitutionally prohibits excessive delegation of congres-
sional power.' Delegation becomes excessive when Congress transfers
legislative powers without providing adequate guidance about how those
powers are to be exercised. Although the Supreme Court used the doc-
trine once the following year,2 nearly five decades then passed before the
Court again held legislation unconstitutional on a similar basis. During
those fifty years, Congress delegated far-reaching powers to a host of ex-
ecutive officers and independent agencies, often with minimal direction
on the use of the powers. The courts, however, always found sufficient
guidance in the delegation and thus no conflict with the Constitution.3
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A., Northwestern University,
1980; J.D., University of Michigan, 1983. I appreciate the valuable comments of colleagues Gerry
Bradley, Ron Rotunda, and Steve Ross, who do not share my views.
1. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (invalidating NIRA in its entirety).
2. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-11 (1936), the Court struck down the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 primarily for lack of federal jurisdiction under the com-
merce clause, but also because the Act delegated regulatory power to certain private groups.
3. To be legitimate, delegations must be guided by intelligible principles. See, e.g., Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 584-94 (1963) (Secretary of Interior's power to apportion Colorado River
waters held limited and guided by, inter alia, congressional limitations on amount of water that
could be allocated to California); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-53 (1947) (holding Federal
Home Loan Bank Board's discretion to make regulations is guided by "well-known and generally
accepted standards" drawn from the long history of banking regulation and corporate management);
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1946) (holding SEC's implementation of
Public Utility Holding Company Act is guided by standards in the Act, which, though facially
vague, "cannot be said to be without meaning, especially to those familiar with corporate realities,"
and by purposes of the Act, by the Act's factual background, and by statutory context of the Act);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944) (administrator of Emergency Price Control Act,
in setting prices for commodities, must meet statutory guidelines of fairness and equity and due
consideration to prevailing prices; "the boundaries of the field of the administrator's permissible
action are marked by the statute"); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-11 (1928) (Tariff
Commission, in fixing rates, held guided "by an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform," i.e., that the tariff should equal the difference
between the prices of foreign and domestic production of the good); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding Cost of Living Council is guided by
statutory floor on prices (not less than those prevailing when Economic Stabilization Act was
passed), by prohibition on singling out a particular industry or sector of the economy, and by pur-
pose of the Act (to stabilize prices), its factual background, and statutory context); Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 13 87-89 (D.D.C.) (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act contains required gui-
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But at about the midpoint of this period, judicial dissatisfaction with
the exercise of delegated powers began to inspire decisions based on the
fifth amendment's due process clause.4 Initially somewhat amorphous,
these decisions have developed into a formulaic doctrine of procedural
due process.5 Under current law, an individual aggrieved by government
action must establish that the government has deprived him of a pro-
tected interest without, providing appropriate procedures.6 The Court
has held that protected interests include government welfare benefits7
dance by establishing a "maximum deficit amount," by requiring Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate and project current and future years'
economic growth, revenues, and outlays, by setting forth specific assumptions to be used by OMB
and CBO, by defining terms, and by referring to years of administrative and congressional experience
in making similar economic projections), aff'd sub nor. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-99 (1961); see also
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (narrowly construing statute delegating power to regu-
late foreign travel in order to avoid potential conflict with substantive due process right to travel).
These cases exemplify a broader judicial trend toward close scrutiny of government security pro-
grams that denied government benefits to those with suspected leftist political opinions. See Rubin,
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044, 1053-60 (1984).
5. The classic article recounting (and recasting) the doctrine is Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). For another good, and more current, general treatment, see
Rubin, supra note 4, at 1047-82.
6. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Current doctrine requires one claiming a due process viola-
tion to establish, first, that government action has deprived her of a protected interest, i.e., "life,
liberty, or property." Individual liberty interests may be grounded in the Constitution, including the
due process clause itself. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977) (fourteenth amend-
ment). Liberty interests may also arise from statutes that, subject only to revocation for specified
causes, entitle the individual to freedom from otherwise legal restraints. See, e.g., Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979) (inmates accorded due
process even though parole determinations need not include either formal hearings or statements of
evidence relied upon). Property interests in government benefits depend on statutory entitlements.
Courts will not deem a statutory entitlement to be a property interest unless the recipient enjoys
more than a subjective unilateral expectation that the benefit is terminable only for cause. See, eg.,
Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 538-39 (Ohio statute requiring for-cause-only termination for civil servants
creates property interest); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978)
(finding entitlement to public utility services). Whether the Constitution specifies an irreducible
minimum of property interests, as it does with liberty interests, is an open question. For my own
views, see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
If a plaintiff establishes a protected interest, the court then asks whether the deprivation was
accompanied by "the process that was due." In answering this second question, courts apply the
three-factor analysis set out in Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. That analysis accounts for the govern-
ment's interest in avoiding procedural complexity, the individual's interest in avoiding erroneous
deprivation, and the potential contribution that additional procedures might make to the accuracy of
results.
Recently the Court has held that deprivation of a protected interest involves more than causing
the loss of an individual's entitlement. See Davidson, 478 U.S. at 347; Daniels, 478 U.S. at 330-31.
7. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-62.
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and tenured public employment, 8 and that they also arise from state-law
entitlements to private wealth. 9 Thus, almost the entire spectrum of ad-
ministrative activity is now subject to judicial scrutiny under the due pro-
cess clause. Along the way, the Court, under authority of the fourteenth
amendment, has applied the same doctrine to the states. 1° Once a court
finds a protected interest, the procedures required for its protection de-
pend on whether the individual's stake in a correct decision exceeds the
government's interest in procedural simplicity. 1
This line of cases, now voluminous even at the Supreme Court
level,12 assumes the Court's authority to require that the legislature fol-
low judicially devised procedures to allocate entitlements that it need not
provide at all. Based on a largely conclusory justification, the Court
holds that the legislature may not define entitlements in solely procedural
terms.1 3 Although the Court has held to this line, I hope to point out
that the rationale for that holding has proven unsatisfactory.
My thesis is that the connection between the nondelegation principle
and the procedural due process cases is more than historical. I suggest
that the due process cases are an enforcement tool for the nondelegation
doctrine. Individuals have a right-a "liberty interest," if you will-to
protection against the exercise of legislative power except as the Consti-
tution provides. If that is so, then Congress's power to abolish disputed
entitlements is no argument against judicially imposed procedures to en-
sure the allocation of entitlements according to congressional standards.
In short, I submit that the nondelegation doctrine forbids the legislative
definition of entitlements in purely procedural terms.
Acceptance of this thesis would significantly alter the due process
analysis. First, since every exercise of delegated legislative power that
threatens an individual with injury presents a question of compliance
with legislative directions, any individual so threatened would, under this
analysis, enjoy a protected liberty interest. This approach would end the
largely arbitrary denial of review to those facing deprivations that do not
8. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39; Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98; Roth, 408 U.S. at 567-78.
9. E.g., Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
10. See, eg., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-48; Roth, 408 U.S. at 538-48; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
260-71.
11. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
12. A partial list would include Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 532; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319;
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974); Roth, 408 U.S. at 564; Perry, 408 U.S. at 593; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254.
13. E.g., Loudennill, 470 U.S. at 541.
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fit into judicial categories of liberty or property. 14 Second, the focus of
the balancing formula for determining the process due would shift from
the substantive weight of the interests involved to the nature of the stan-
dards governing the power exercised. Finally, if the due process cases
really rest on the nondelegation doctrine, constitutional scrutiny of state
entitlement decisions would be substantially curtailed, because the Con-
stitution does not recognize any enforceable right to the structure of state.
governments.
Part I sets out the foundations of the nondelegation doctrine. Part
II considers how the nondelegation doctrine explains the due process
cases better than the prevailing theory. Part III explores and defends the
implications of a delegation approach to procedural due process cases.
I. Two VERSIONS OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. The Structural Integrity Principle.
Article I of the Constitution vests "all legislative powers herein
granted" in Congress. The Supreme Court has always read this provi-
sion to limit the delegation of legislative powers to noncongressional ac-
tors. 15  Nevertheless, practical government involves substantial
delegation of authority, and until 1935 the Court, although consistently
maintaining in dicta the existence of a nondelegation doctrine, had never
held a delegation of legislative power unconstitutional.1 6 If there is, as
some have questioned,' 7 a nondelegation doctrine, what values does it
serve?
At one level, the justification for the doctrine is clear enough. Ac-
cording to the "structural integrity principle," the Constitution estab-
lishes a form of government based on separation of powers and popular
representation, and delegation without limit circumvents this constitu-
tional structure.18 For example, if Congress simply delegated all its pow-
14. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-66.
15. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government or-
dained by the Constitution."); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 36 (1825).
16. See, e.g., Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and
the Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443,454 (978) ("Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan was the
first case in which a delegation of legislative power was ruled invalid by the Supreme Court.").
17. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-54 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (Supreme Court has "virtually abandoned" nondelegation doctrine); 1 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 151-52 (2d ed. 1978) (same); Duff & Whiteside, Delegata
Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 196
(1929) (nondelegation doctrine is based on "thinnest of implications" from constitutional text).
18. See S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
37 (1975) ("The best theoretical foundation for the rule of nondelegation is the simple expectation in
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ers to the President-as the German Reichstag did to Hitler in 193319-
the protection afforded to individual liberty by this separation of powers
would be lost.
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, handed down in
1935, reflects the Court's justifiable concern with the integrity of the gov-
ernment. There, the Court struck down the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, which delegated to the President nearly all of the legislative
commerce power-in effect, the power to plan the national economy. 20
Although the Act contemplated presidential approval of "Codes of Fair
Competition" promulgated in the first instance by business and labor
groups, the Act allowed the President to make any change that a pro-
posed code required for the "protection of... the public interest," and it
also authorized the President to promulgate and enforce codes on his
own motion.21
the constituent act of establishing government that neither the government nor any of its parts
should change the constitutional arrangement of offices and powers."). Professor Barber distin-
guishes this concern for constitutional supremacy from the separation of powers because "a principle
of nondelegation is a presupposition of the separation of powers, not a rule derived from the separa-
tion of powers." Id. His analysis is in part persuasive; even if a constitution ordained a government
consisting solely of a supreme parliament, the parliament could not constitutionally delegate all its
powers to some private person. On the other hand, citizens in a society without a written constitu-
tion very well might jealously guard the separation of powers. In such a society, separation of
powers would itself furnish a reason for a nondelegation doctrine. Thus, under a constitution such
as that of the United States, which affirms both constitutional supremacy and separation of powers,
the nondelegation doctrine serves two independent but mutually reinforcing values. Together, con-
stitutional supremacy and separation of powers imply both the structural integrity principle and the
intelligible principle requirement.
19. See OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMI-
NALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 8-11 (1947).
20. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 8 (1982) (NIRA gave President "almost total control of the economy").
21. The Act, which is reprinted in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 521 n.4 (1935), authorized groups of businessmen to submit for presidential approval "Codes of
Fair Competition" fixing prices, output, and wages. Under NIRA section 3(a), any code so promul-
gated could be modified by the President "in furtherance of the public interest" with such exceptions
as "the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy [t]herein declared."
Under section 3(d), if producers could not agree upon a code, the President was authorized to pro-
mulgate one, either at the request of an interested person or at his own instance. The extraordinary
vice of the NIRA was not its delegation of preliminary power to private persons, but its delegation of
the power to plan the national economy to the President. The briefs in the Schecter Poultry case
concentrate on presidential power and virtually ignore the role of the private producer associations:
By the Recovery Act Congress has delegated to the president of the United States the
power to approve so-called codes of fair competition which may be presented to him by
"representative" trade or industrial associations. When and if such codes of fair competi-
tion are approved by the President each and every provision thereof has the full force and
effect of law and violations thereof are constituted crimes. It is our contention that such a
delegation of power is purely and simply a delegation of legislative power to the President
of the United States on account of the fact that Congress has set up no intelligible policies
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The aggrandizement of presidential power effected by the Act
presented an obvious danger to the integrity of the government.
Whatever one may think of any given President, no President ought to
have the power to exclude individuals from commerce arbitrarily or vin-
dictively. Imagine a Congressman considering whether to oppose the
President on an important matter. Under the Act, could such a Con-
gressman exclude the possibility that his constituents might find the
prices of their produce raised to ruinous heights, or lowered to ruinous
depths? That their quota of national output might be suddenly reduced?
When the delegated power is so sweeping and the delegate already so
powerful, the theoretical revocability of the delegation is irrelevant. The
legislative check on executive action could be subverted by the exercise of
the very power granted by the disputed delegation.
B. The Intelligible Principle Requirement.
The Court has also struck down far less sweeping delegations, under
circumstances that one may not fairly describe as involving the integrity
of the government. These cases-Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 22 INS v.
Chadha, 23 and Bowsher v. Synar 24-reflect on a small scale the values
that were more dramatically at stake in Schecter Poultry. Departure
from the constitutional structure is forbidden because the Constitution
specifies rules of validity for legislation, rules that serve fundamental
political values.25 Circumvention of the constitutional process of law-
making, even on issues of only modest political interest, can offend those
values and thus offend the requirement that delegations and delegates
remain subject to the pluralist constraints imposed on Congress by the
Constitution. Protection of these values is embodied in the so-called "in-
telligible principle" requirement, which mandates that Congress guide all
delegations by an intelligible principle.
Article I not only vests legislative power in a popular assembly; it
also places difficult obstacles in the path of any exercise of the powers
to govern the President, no standards to guide and restrict the President in his action, and
no procedure for making determinations in conformity with due process of law.
Brief for A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. at 25-26, Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 495 (Nos. 854 &
864). Justice Brandeis, a supporter of the administration, reportedly told an administration represen-
tative not that the Schecter decision condemned diffusing power among private groups, but rather
that it demonstrated the Court's unwillingness to "let this government centralize everything." Aran-
son, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 20, at 10 n.35 (quoting A. SCHLESINGER, THE POLrCS OF
UPHEAVAL 280 (1960)).
22. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
23. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
24. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
25. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (Congress may not abdicate "the
essential legislative functions with which it is [constitutionally] ... vested.").
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granted to Congress. The bicameral structure of Congress and the Presi-
dent's veto power subject legislative decisions both to subsequent elec-
toral accountability and to the present scrutiny of diverse interests. The
Constitution thus establishes a form of political pluralism: no legislation
may succeed that offends either the states as semisovereign bodies, any
coalition based on popular sentiment or local interest, or the President's
national constituency.26 The Constitution states that no legislation shall
become law without satisfying these checks. Reflecting a substantive
preference for either private ordering or state regulation over federal leg-
islation, article I places the burden of creating federal positive law on the
proponents of congressional action.27
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. In defending the bicameralism and presentment proce-
dures, the Framers emphasized both the danger of usurpation, which supports the structural integ-
rity principle, and the usefulness of pluralism in preventing unwise laws, which supports the
intelligible principle requirement. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 317-18 (A. Hamilton or J.
Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1987):
First ... [A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and
dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It
doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in
schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise
be sufficient ....
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and
numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be
seduced by factious leaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions .... [A] body
which is to correct this infirmity ought itself be free from it, and consequently ought to be
less numerous. It ought, moreover to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to
hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
Hamilton made the same points in THE FEDERALST No. 73, at 376-77 (M. Beloff ed. 1987), while
defending the presidential veto:
The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive, is to
enable him to defend himself; the secondary, is to increase the chances in favour of the
community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The
oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations
of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from
want of due deliberation, or those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some
common passion or interest. It is far less probable that culpable views of any kind should
infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same
object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.
It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of prevent-
ing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this
objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that
inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character
and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain
the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they may happen to
be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable
to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by
defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a
number of bad ones.
27. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 133-34 (1980) ("Much as liberals may not like it,
one reason we have broadly based representative assemblies is to await something approaching a
consensus before government intervenes.") (footnote omitted); Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective
Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agen-
cies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 957-58; Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 584-85
(1972).
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The Court recently has taken three opportunities to affirm unequiv-
ocally the importance of procedural checks on legislative action in cases
not involving any politically dangerous transfer of power. In INS v.
Chadha, the Court struck down the one-house legislative veto as an un-
constitutional circumvention of the presentment and bicameralism re-
quirements.28 The Court reasoned that by delegating legislative power to
some of its members, Congress could take legislative action without satis-
fying the political constraints of article I. The initial passage of the dele-
gating legislation could not satisfy the constitutional rules of validity,
because the delegating legislation included no criteria-no intelligible
principle-restricting the delegate's subsequent policy choice.29
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, took a similar view while
concurring in Bowsher v. Synar. 30 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
assigned the Comptroller General authority to determine the specific
budget cuts required by Congress's failure to meet deficit reduction
targets. The Bowsher majority viewed this determination as an inher-
ently executive power, and the Comptroller as an agent of Congress.
Since Congress may not, any more than a real estate swindler, convey
what it does not rightfully own, the statute's delegation usurped presi-
dential powers in violation of article 11.31
In Justice Stevens's view, however, the statute, like the legislative
veto at issue in Chadha, conferred legislative power on a congressional
agent.32 This seems a more accurate description of the power at issue.
The appropriations power is a core legislative prerogative, and the ulti-
mate effect of the Comptroller General's decision would have been to
alter appropriations. The Act itself provided that if the automatic cuts
were held unconstitutional, the power to cut would revert to Congress.33
Even if the Act had assigned the disputed functions to an executive
agent, such as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Congress could have passed subsequent appropriations reinstating the
items cut by the Executive. Justice Stevens maintained that since the
statutory criteria for making the cuts were not self-executing, the statute
effectively delegated legislative appropriations power, a power that could
28. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also supra note 26 (discussing presentment and bicameralism
requirements).
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954-55. Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
provided only that deportation would proceed if either House passed a resolution "stating in sub-
stance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation." See id. at 925.
30. 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 726.
32. Id. at 751-52.
33. Id. at 750-5 1.
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not be delegated without violating article I. 34
Both Chadha and the Bowsher concurrence may be read as implica-
ting the structural integrity principle, since in both cases Congress dele-
gated legislative power to its own creatures. As Justice Stevens argued,
such delegation presents a risk of congressional self-aggrandizement ab-
sent from delegations to the President or independent agencies. 35 If the
initial delegation, even to congressional creatures, were specific enough,
there would be no reason to prohibit it. That is, if both Houses and the
President knew the policy import of a delegation to one House, or to a
congressional agent, the delegating legislation's bicameral passage and
successful presentment would satisfy article I.
Justice Stevens's concern with congressional circumvention of arti-
cle I is, I think, more urgent in Chadha, because there the veto could
reverse the exercise of delegated power for any reason or no reason; the
delegation of the veto power to the two Houses contained no intelligible
principle. 36 On the other hand, in cases involving an intelligible principle
clear enough for the delegate to apply and the courts to police, Congress
has no reason for delegating the power to agents within its control. Put
another way, the legislative veto is unconstitutional because it is useful
only to the extent that it circumvents article I.
The Court's recent decision in Morrison v. Olson, 37 upholding the
constitutionality of the special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics of
Government Act, implies no decline in judicial skepticism about assign-
ment of legislative powers to congressional agents. The Morrison Court
decided only that Congress may, under certain circumstances, assign ex-
ecutive power to an office insulated to a degree from presidential re-
moval. This decision may seem at odds with the Bowsher majority
opinion, 38 but it in no way casts doubt on Chadha. Moreover, to the
extent that Morrison undermines the majority position in Bowsher with-
out overruling the decision, Morrison may even bolster the precedential
force of Justice Stevens's concurrence.
34. Id. at 757-58.
35. Id.
36. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 925; supra note 29. In contrast, while the Comptroller General's
task at issue in Bowsher was far from ministerial, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act surely provided
an intelligible principle for its exercise.
37. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
38. Bowsher and Morrison can be reconciled by classifying the special counsel as a sort of in-
dependent agency. Since Congress plays no role in the removal of a special counsel, footnote four of
the Bowsher opinion recognizes the constitutionality of limits on the President's removal power. See
478 U.S. at 725 n.4. But it is hard to understand why the transfer of executive power to Congress is
less legitimate than the transfer of executive power to an officer not recognized at all in the constitu-
tional text. The tendency of the Bowsher majority's analysis to undermine the constitutionality of
independent agencies is another point in favor of Justice Stevens's concurrence.
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At the extreme, legislative limits on executive powers may threaten
the structural integrity principle. But delegation of executive power is
not subject to the intelligible principle requirement; personal direction
by, and accountability to, the President are the constitutionally provided
mechanisms for effective administration. Since the President's inherent
constitutional power is insufficient, without legislative authorization, to
abridge most individual freedoms, the constitutional checks on legisla-
tion are likewise checks on executive action.39 With respect either to
enforcing legislation or to exercising inherent constitutional powers, the
President is not subject to any checks parallel to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements that confront the exercise of legislative
power.40 Thus, even if one reads Morrison to permit legislative usurpa-
39. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (inherent presidential
power does not authorize seizure of private property to further an undeclared war).
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 361 (A. Hamilton) (M. Belof ed. 1987):
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just men-
tioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnec-
essary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is
here, too, that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is
oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that
department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet
often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the major-
ity. When a resolution, too, is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolu-
tion is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate, or
atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure
and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass
and weaken the executive of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to
the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive,
which are the most necessary ingredients in its compostion-vigour and expedition. And
this without any counterbalancing good.
Thus, when the issue is the constitutionality of legislative restrictions on inherent executive powers,
the only questions to ask are whether the powers so limited are indeed inherently executive and
whether the congressional limitation threatens congressional self-aggrandizement in violation of the
structural integrity principle. In Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619, the Court assumed that law enforce-
ment is an inherently executive power-an assumption that has been subjected to acute criticism.
See Bradley, Law Enforcement and Separation of Powers, 30 ARMZ. L. REV. - (forthcoming,
1988). The Court then concluded that the Ethics in Government Act did not threaten presidential
power to the benefit of Congress. See 108 S. Ct. at 2616-22. This conclusion may reflect the idea
that some portion of the Executive's prosecutorial power is insulated from executive control. But it
is more plausible to read the Court's opinion as holding that the Ethics in Government Act's "for
cause" provision governing removal of a special counsel by the Attorney General falls short of insu-
lating the special counsel from executive control. Cf Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. C-.
REv. 41, 87.
Because the President's order to an officer to take an action within the scope of the officer's
discretion is a legally valid action, the officer's refusal to follow the order can easily be
considered to be a form of "neglect of duty" or "malfeasance" for which removal is ex-
pressly provided under the terms of the statutes establishing purportedly "independent"
agencies.
Id. (footnote omitted). But even on the assumption that Morrison allows Congress to create an
officer exercising executive powers who is removable "only in accordance with the will of Congress
as expressed in the Act," 108 S. Ct. at 2620 n.33, the constitutionality of legislative limits on execu-
tive power has little to do with constitutional limits on legislative power.
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tion of executive powers, 41 the decision casts no doubt on the Court's
seriousness about the constitutional checks on the exercise of legislative
power.
Contemporary decisions thus reflect the Court's concern with sub-
jecting the exercise of legislative power to article I requirements. Sub-
stantive political values, rather than mere formalism, support this
concern. By delegating legislative power without concomitant legislative
guidelines, Congress enables the creation of law without the affirmative
approval of the constituencies represented by the actors in the article I
process.
Modern defenders of the nondelegation doctrine tend to obscure this
point by emphasizing the need for legislative accountability. Concurring
in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 42 then-
Justice Rehnquist defended the doctrine as follows:
As formulated and enforced by this Court, the nondelegation doctrine
serves three important functions. First, and most abstractly, it ensures
to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that
important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of
our Government most responsive to the popular will. Second, the doc-
trine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to dele-
gate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an
"intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion.
Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that courts
charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion
will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards.43
The need to review agency actions against legislative standards, as the
Chief Justice concedes, depends on the unconstitutionality of a standard-
less delegation in the first instance. So too does the second reason; if the
Constitution does not forbid standardless delegations, there is no consti-
tutional need for congressional direction. The case for the intelligible
principle requirement then condenses to the argument that Congress it-
self must make certain kinds of policy decisions, an argument that the
Chief Justice predicates on accountability."4
Many distinguished commentators have defended this emphasis on
41. It is worth pointing out that the perceived defect of prosecutorial independence is not an
objectionably lax refusal to prosecute, but an objectionably overzealous insistence on prosecution.
See 108 S. Ct. at 2638-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Ethics in Government Act, however, made no
attempt to limit, and could not constitutionally have limited, the President's pardon power under
article II, section 2, clause 2. That power can nullify any prosecution, even before the investigation
begins. See Ex Parle Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867). In practical terms, the Act could not expose
anyone to prosecution contrary to the will of the President.
42. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).




accountability.45 Modem public choice theory suggests that delegation
enables individual legislators to reduce the political costs of policies that
injure relatively uninterested voters, without losing credit for benefits be-
stowed on those interest groups intensely enough motivated to trace the
chain of power.46
This public choice analysis has considerable force, but falls short of
making a constitutional case for the intelligible principle requirement.
The approach suggests that delegation would satisfy article I if Congress
made the delegate completely accountable for all of its actions. No one
could then doubt the ultimately congressional source of legal rules. But
even if Congress could somehow arrange perfect after-the-fact accounta-
bility, the result would offend article I. Chadha, after all, involved pre-
cisely a device that rendered the delegate of legislative power too
accountable to the legislative branch. Perfect accountability would not
stop Congress from avoiding constitutional checks on its lawmaking
powers by apparently delegating authority to, but in fact exercising
power through, congressional creatures.
Any intelligible principle requirement, then, must ensure that the
delegate implement Congress's policy choices according to article I con-
straints. It is entirely conceivable that the delegate might be less suscep-
tible than Congress to the perverse incentives of interest group politics.47
As a constitutional matter, however, the point is less that delegation pre-
dictably leads to results condemned by contemporary policy analyses
than that delegation leads to decisions different from those that Congress
would have made if pressed to do so. Delegating power for the purpose
of avoiding the institutional incentives operating on Congress is precisely
what the nondelegation doctrine forbids.
The public choice justification for the nondelegation doctrine is
therefore no more satisfactory than the defense of expansive delegation
on the ground that interest group politics render congressional decision-
making perverse. Both arguments amount to rewriting the Constitution,
one version moving to strip Congress of certain article I powers, the
other moving to prohibit Congress from delegating any such power be-
45. See J. ELY, supra note 27, at 131-34; T. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM ch. 5 (2d ed.
1979); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 20, at 63-67; Schwartz, supra note 16, at 459-60;
see also Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1223, 1243-1246 (1985) ("The Court's current application of the delegation doctrine, by way of
an amorphous and ultimately meaningless definition of legislative power, undercuts the accountabil-
ity the Constitution seeks to protect.").
46. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 20, at 64.
47. See Mashaw, ProDelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 81, 85 (1985).
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cause congressional outcomes are likely to be less perverse than agency
outcomes.
This is not to say that notions of institutional competence and polit-
ical incentives are irrelevant. Rather, I submit that the analytical start-
ing point is the explicit delegation of article I powers to Congress. The
reasons for reposing powers in a body of that character control the extent
of further delegations. 48 We must work backward from the authoritative
text to discover the governing principles, not forward from our favored
principles to discover the authoritative text. As I have argued above,49
the principle underlying the article I process is a preference for either
private ordering or state legislation over federal legislation, a principle
implemented by empowering a variety of constituencies independently to
block, but not to enable, federal legislation.
The intelligible principle requirement therefore has the object of en-
suring that Congress makes important policy decisions according to the
pluralist constraints that the Constitution imposes on congressional ac-
tion. The caselaw regularly recites, on behalf of this purpose, the re-
quirement of an intelligible principle for valid delegations of legislative
power.50 Violation of this requirement alone is sufficient to invalidate an
otherwise constitutional delegation: at least one Supreme Court case,
never overruled, has held a delegation unconstitutional without stating
any plausible grounds other than the lack of an intelligible principle.
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 51 the Court struck down section
9(c) of the same National Industrial Recovery Act that it later dis-
patched wholesale in Schecter Poultry. This section authorized the Presi-
48. See Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 307,
336 (1976):
Whenever a court concludes that the Framers regarded the proper exercise of a specific
legislative power as closely dependent upon the unique institutional competence of Con-
gress, the non-delegation doctrine would prohibit Congress from delegating that power to
another. In these circumstances, the act of delegation would so alter the manner of the
power's exercise that the resulting arrangement would no longer be compatible with the
Framers' reasons for vesting the power in an institution whose character and nature are
defined in the special ways-of political responsiveness and broad-based diversity-that
those of Congress are.
Professor Freedman argues that the nondelegation doctrine primarily forbids any exercise of core
legislative functions, such as taxing and impeachment. The limitation of his analysis to a few legisla-
tive powers, however, is unconvincing, because the reason for vesting any of the article I powers in
Congress is to confine the exercise of that power according to the obstacle-course procedures of
article I, section 7, and the institutional incentives bearing on an elected assembly. Of course, certain
constitutional provisions may be inconsistent with any delegation, however clearly directed. It may
also be that certain article I powers may be delegated with less specificity than others.
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(citing Schecter Poultry and Panama Refining) (plurality opinion); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746-51 (D.D.C. 1971).
51. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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dent to prohibit interstate shipment of petroleum produced or withdrawn
from storage in violation of state laws designed to cope with an oil glut.5 2
If Congress really failed to provide an intelligible principle to guide the
President in deciding when to prohibit such shipments,5 3 section 9(c) was
void because it authorized the Piesident to pass legislation free from the
checks imposed by bicameralism and the broad range of interests repre-
sented in Congress. 5 4
The irreducible element of controversy in delegation cases is the
presence or absence of an intelligible principle. My thesis, however, does
not depend on how broadly or narrowly the courts interpret the intelligi-
ble principle requirement, although the scope of procedural protection
accorded by the requirement may vary somewhat on that basis. All that
the connection between the nondelegation doctrine and the procedural
due process cases depends on is the existence of a constitutional require-
ment that Congress define federal policy. A surprising consensus-one
that covers the ideological spectrum from J. Skelly Wright to William H.
Rehnquist-recognizes such a requirement, however unclear and con-
tested its ultimate dimensions may be.55
II. THE RIGHT/PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION AND THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. The Right/Privilege Distinction and Its Defenders.
The paradigmatic example of the right/privilege distinction comes
from McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 5 6 in which a policeman was
fired for violating a regulation that impinged upon his right of free ex-
pression. Justice Holmes noted that "the petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman. T57 The state conditioned the unprotected privilege of being a
policeman on giving up, at least in part, the protected right of free
expression.5 8
52. Id. at 406.
53. Cf id. at 434-35 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 430.
55. Those who have called for more vigorous enforcement of the intelligible principle require-
ment include Chief Justice Rehnquist, Judge Wright, Judge McGowan, Dean Ely, and Professors
Lowi, Schwartz, Freedman, Aranson, Gelihorn, and Robinson. See American Petroleum Institute,
448 U.S. at 687 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); J. ELY, supra note 27, at 131-34; T. LowI, supra
note 45, ch. 5; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 20, at 43-45; McGowan, Congress, Court,
and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1127-30 (1977); Wright, supra note 27, at
585.
56. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
57. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
58. Id., 29 N.E. at 517-18.
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In defining constitutionally protected rights, the fifth and fourteenth
amendments forbid governmental deprivations of "life, liberty or prop-
erty" without "due process of law." In the absence of a constitutional
right to government benefits, a constitutional distinction between rights
and privileges would authorize the government to condition benefits on
acceptance of whatever procedures the legislature provides for distribut-
ing or terminating the benefits in question. In 1970, however, in
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that current welfare recipients
(but not applicants) have a constitutional property interest in their bene-
fits.5 9 Accordingly, the Court found itself required to determine what
"process" was "due," that is, what procedures the Constitution required
the state to follow before terminating benefits.6
Goldberg clearly rejected the claim that the government's constitu-
tional authority to eliminate an entitlement implies the authority to con-
dition the entitlement on procedures of its own choosing. But the
reasoning that justified this rejection of the right/privilege distinction is
less than compelling. Goldberg did no more than refer to prior cases in
which the Court had found that constitutional entitlements had the prac-
tical effect of violating constitutional rights to mobility, free exercise of
religion, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 61
The fear that allowing conditional entitlements might lead legisla-
tures to compel the wholesale waiver of constitutional rights has per-
suaded Supreme Court majorities for at least seventy years. 62 This
59. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court's approach at least partially approved Professor Reich's
"new property" argument for recognizing enforceable "entitlements" to prevent the government
from suppressing individual liberties by manipulating its largess. See Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965); Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-86 (1964).
60. 397 U.S. at 260-66.
61. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
62. For example, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), the Court invali-
dated a state statute that conditioned a corporation's privilege of conducting intrastate business on
the payment of a fee figured as a percentage of total authorized capital (including capital dedicated
to business in other states and to interstate commerce). A parade of horribles figured in the decision,
although the nature of the horrible may have changed somewhat between then and now:
Can such a regulation be deemed constitutional any more than one requiring the company,
as a condition of its doing intrastate business, that it should surrender its right, for in-
stance, to invoke the protection of the Constitution when it is proposed to deprive it of its
property without due process of law, or to deny it the equal protection of the laws?
Id. at 35. By 1926 the parade of horribles was evident in its modem form, although it was still
deployed in the context of state restrictions on the privilege of doing business:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens
otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general
rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such condi-
tions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and
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parade-of-horribles approach, however, seems defective for three related
reasons. First, the independent constitutional rights that legislative con-
ditions might undermine offer a direct reason for prohibiting the condi-
tional dispensation of entitlements. First amendment analysis, for
example, condemns conditioning entitlements on the waiver of the right
to free expression or religious exercise. 63 As Professor Westen points
out, courts can best resolve these cases by inquiring specifically into the
degree of practical restraint that particular conditions impose on particu-
lar constitutional rights.64 This approach curtails the parade of hor-
ribles, without assuming free-wheeling judicial authority to second-guess
legislative entitlement decisions.
one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional
right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is
inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
be manipulated out of existence.
Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). Holmes, joined by Brandeis, urged in
dissent that the greater power of abolishing the privilege includes the lesser of conditioning it. Id. at
600-02 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
At the very dawn of due process adjudication under both the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
the Court expressly rejected the idea that due process of law was whatever law the legislature had
provided. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855) (rejecting possibility that Congress could make "any process 'due process of law', by its mere
will"). The Court gave a similar answer about the fourteenth amendment in Davidson v. New Orle-
ans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877):
It is easy to see that when the great barons of England wrung from King John, at the point
of the sword, the concession that neither their lives nor their property should be disposed
of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they meant by "law of the land"
the ancient and customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted by the Parliament of
which those barons were a controlling element. It was not in their minds, therefore, to
protect themselves against the enactment of laws by the Parliament of England. But when,
in the year of grace 1866, there is placed in the Constitution of the United States a declara-
tion that "no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law," can a State make any thing due process of law which, by its own legislation, it
chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the States is of no
avail, or has no application where the invasion of private rights is effected under the forms
of State legislation. It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms, and without
more, that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now in A., shall
be and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due
process of laW, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The Court, however, was and is reluctant to constitutionalize the law of property. If the fourteenth
amendment does not contain a substantive definition of property, the positivist approach is logically
unassailable. Even if the amendment does contain an independent definition of property, that defini-
tion would defer to state positive law to such an extent that with respect to entitlement programs, the
states could define eligibility in purely procedural terms. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text.
63. See, eg., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (South Carolina could not deny unem-
ployment benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on weekends because of religious
beliefs); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (California could not condition certain tax exemp-
tions on requirement that taxpayer sign statement indicating that he does not advocate overthrow of
United States government).
64. Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of
Another, 66 IOWA L. REv. 741 (1981).
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Second, the judicial justification for rejection of the right/privilege
distinction is illogical. Unless the Court is willing to recognize a substan-
tive constitutional right to government transfer payments or public em-
ployment65-something it has never been willing to do-the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply to entitlement cases.
When the federal government conditions entitlements on waiver of rights
to free expression or against self-incrimination, the denial of a govern-
ment benefit punishes an independent constitutional right. In contrast,
when transfer payments or public employment are conditioned on such a
waiver, the constitutional right is to "property," which the Court equates
with statutory entitlement. Yet the statute creating the entitlement de-
fines "property" in terms of the results of statutory procedures. If the
only "property" the claimant has is what the statute creates, why is the
procedural aspect of the entitlement open to judicial manipulation when
the substantive component is not?
The accepted rationale appears to involve nothing more than the
claim that regrettable consequences would follow from the obvious
interpretation of the Constitution. Policy arguments have a role in con-
stitutional interpretation, but the policies on which constitutional adjudi-
cation turns ought to have some basis in the document itself. The
judicial rejection of the right/privilege distinction, however, admits that
a plausible reading of the document is denied because judges prefer that
the reading were not plausible.
The Court's latest rejection of the right/privilege distinction makes
clear the poverty of modern procedural due process doctrine. In Cleve-
land Board of Education v. Loudermill, 66 the Court unequivocally re-
jected the right/privilege distinction without offering any justification
beyond the parade of horribles:
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that
certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be de-
prived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The
categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Prop-
erty" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation
any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is con-
ferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While
the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public]
employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of
such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
65. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970),(government transfer payments); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (public employment).




The quotation is negatively impressive; I have omitted no further at-
tempts at justification. After generations of litigation, all the Court is
willing to say is that the right/privilege distinction is not the law. "Mere
fiat" is a phrase too often used, but surely those words describe the
Loudermill Court's approach.
Third, a substantial policy argument opposes the rejection of the
right/privilege distinction. As Justice Black, dissenting in Goldberg,68
and Judge Easterbrook 69 have observed, the imposition of judicial proce-
dures may reduce the liberality of legislative entitlements. Cost and de-
lay in removing individuals from welfare rolls or public employment may
reduce the government's willingness to grant those entitlements in the
first place.70 The individual's stake in the protected right is one term in
the Mathews balancing formula, which determines the scope of proce-
dural protection. The Mathews approach thus recognizes the seriousness
of the problem.71 But it also admits, albeit tacitly, that whether judges
possess the technical and constitutional competence to make this deter-
mination remains dubious.72
Commentators defending the Court's approach have sought to find
within it a dignitary theory of due process.73 Beginning with Professor
Van Alstyne's 1968 article, 74 they claim that the due process clause rec-
ognizes a liberty interest in fair procedures. 75 The point of these digni-
67. Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the result in part)).
68. 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
69. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. Cr. REv. 85, 111-15.
70. Verkuil, The Search for a Legal Ethic The Adversary System, Liberalism and Beyond, 60
SOUNDINGS 54, 62 n.34 (1977):
Before Goldberg, enrollment in AFDC programs was largely based upon self-certification
of eligibility through the use of sworn statements which could be reviewed later and inel-
igibles culled from the rolls through expeditious termination procedures. Since Goldberg
made the termination decision much more protracted, many states tightened up on the
initial enrollment process. This change necessarily delays entry into the program for eligi-
ble claimants as well as delaying departure of ineligibles.
71. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976);supra notes 6, 11 and accompanying
text.
72. Cf Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 118 ("The contents of the legislation are the best avail-
able evidence about the value the affected people place on hearings.").
73. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L.
REV. 885 (1981); Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in Procedural Due Process, in Nomos
XVIII: Dun PROCESS 126 (J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1977).
74. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1439 (1968).
75. Prior to Goldberg, Roth, and Mathews, this made reasonably good sense. There are hints of
this approach in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), a water-
shed case in which some of the Justices linked administrative due process to the natural-law concept
of "fundamental fairness" that governs due process in criminal cases. Id. at 902 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). But the criminal cases by definition involve the potential deprivation of liberty or property.
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tary theories is that constitutional "libeity" includes freedom from unfair
procedures. If this is so, then judicially created property interests-like
the interests created in welfare benefits by the Goldberg Court76 -are ir-
relevant, for the freedom from unfair procedures is independent of con-
text: the government may not injure anyone without fair procedures,
irrespective of whether the injury affects liberty, property, privilege, or
preference. The dignitary theories conflict with the Court's preoccupa-
tion with identifying protected categories of entitlement. More impor-
tantly, they conflict with the textual language inspiring this
preoccupation. Since all dignitary theories depend on equating liberty
and process,77 all read the due process clause to forbid the deprivation of
liberty without liberty, or the deprivation of process without process.
Admittedly, a powerful argument urges interpretation of the due
process clause as a unitary term of art, rather than as a concatenation of
words whose contemporary meaning turns out to be agreeable. As John
Ely notes, "[u]ntil recently, the general outlines of the law of procedural
due process were pretty clear and uncontroversial. The phrase 'life, lib-
erty or property' was read as a unit and given an open-ended, functional
interpretation, which meant that the government couldn't seriously hurt
you without due process of law."78 But even treating the due process
clause as requiring the (substantive) rule of law informed by an irreduci-
ble minimum of extrinsic justice, the nondelegation predicate makes
sense. In a liberal democracy the rule of law means living according to
the prescriptions of an elected assembly, defined by constitutional rules
of validity. Surely, in such a democracy, adherence by government func-
tionaries to the enactments of the popular assembly lies close to the heart
of the "law of the land."' 79 The nondelegation doctrine thus depends not
just on article I, but on a further commitment to abide by and enforce the
constitutional rules of validity there ordained. If due process is taken to
mean even as little as fidelity to valid positive law, hearing rights could be
imposed as a means of enforcing these article I rules of validity. The
doctrinal connection I propose, then, is consistent with both reductionist
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 73, at 887.
78. J. ELY, supra note 27, at 19 (footnote omitted).
79. The language of the due process clause traces to chapter 39 of Magna Carta. See, e.g., A.
HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 298-315 (1968). In chapter 39, the King pledged that
"[n]o freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or
banished, or in any way molested; and we will not set forth against him, nor send against him, unless
by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 123 (1957). Ironically, although the due process
clause protects many more people (persons rather than freemen), Magna Carta protects a broader
range of individual interests than does the Court's insistence on finding "liberty" or "property"
before imposing any procedural protection.
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and expansionist readings of the due process clause as a term of art, and
with the Supreme Court's contemporary plain man's literalism.
The basis of my thesis should now be apparent, and takes the form
of three propositions. First, the intelligible principle requirement states a
recognized, but effectively inchoate, rule of constitutional law. Second,
the procedural due process cases reflect a perceived need to confine the
exercise of administrative power according to rational procedures.
Third, the procedural due process doctrine lacks a legitimate predicate in
recognized rules of constitutional law. The conclusion that follows is
that the nondelegation doctrine-not the stated rationale of the due pro-
cess cases-actually confines legislative power.
B. Enforcing the Liberty Interest in Legislative Legitimacy.
In Panama Refining, the Court allowed the Panama Refining Com-
pany standing to contest a legislative delegation that caused it injury. 80
The Court recognized Chadha's standing to sue on the same basis.81 I
submit that both litigants asserted a constitutional liberty interest, and
that just as the Court has legitimately granted relief in particular cases of
unconstitutional delegation, the Court can legitimately impose proce-
dural safeguards to enforce the nondelegation doctrine's intelligible prin-
ciple requirement.
If a statutory delegation survives scrutiny because it states an intelli-
gible principle, then conformity to that principle is a constitutional as
well as a statutory issue. Departure from the principle means that the
statutory delegation exceeds constitutional limitations and that the body
receiving the delegation supersedes Congress as the policymaker.
If individuals suffering injury from violations of the nondelegation
doctrine may sue for direct redress, as Panama Refining and Chadha
suggest, then the Court may also prescribe, and allow individuals to sue
to enforce, prophylactic procedures that prevent the violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. In other areas, the Court has found that en-
forcement of constitutional requirements depends on such procedures.
For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court required the administra-
tion of warnings about criminal defendants' rights to silence and to coun-
sel in order to enforce the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. 82 In Addington v. Texas, the Court required proof by
clear and convincing evidence before an individual may be deprived of
liberty in a civil commitment proceeding. 83 Both Miranda warnings and
80. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1935).
81. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935-36 (1983).
82. 384 U.S. 436, 492-95 (1966).
83. 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
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Addington burdens of proof are judicially created and judicially enforce-
able procedural requirements that protect constitutional rights even
when the complaining party cannot establish that the government has
violated those rights.
More direct support for the existence of a right to fair procedures
comes in recent Supreme Court cases requiring clear congressional au-
thorization of administrative action before a statute can be interpreted as
delegating power in possible conflict with the nondelegation doctrine.8 4
If the Court explicitly relies on this intelligible principle requirement to
narrow facially sweeping delegations, why may it not also impose hearing
requirements toward the same object? Either approach constrains illegit-
imate exercises of delegated power that might otherwise escape redress.
But a retrospective judicial narrowing of overbroad delegations merely
transfers the illegitimate exercise of article I powers to the courts-statu-
tory "construction" with a vengeance-while a prospective requirement
of fair procedures reduces the chance that the delegate will disregard, or
fail to discover, what guidance Congress has provided.85
Will hearing requirements actually enforce the intelligible principle
requirement? The due process cases proceed on this very assumption.
The traditional due process analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge views hear-
ings strictly as a means to the end of accurate resolution according to
legislative criteria.8 6 Even in the rulemaking context, a hearing (paper or
otherwise) increases the likelihood that the rule selected by the congres-
sional delegate conforms to the intelligible principle governing the
delegation.
From a public choice perspective, procedural guarantees such as pri-
vate hearing rights tend to merge agency and congressional procedures.
84. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion) ("In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Con-
gress intended to give the Secretary ... unprecedented power .... "); National Cable Television
Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974) (ambiguous statute found not to delegate taxing
power to the FCC); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 502-03 (1959) (various defense authorization
statutes did not delegate to the Department of Defense the power "to fashion programs under which
persons may be seriously restrained in their employment opportunities"); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958) (Court "will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute" funda-
mental liberties, such as the right to travel).
85. The Court's practice of narrowly construing statutes that delegate power to administrators
without an intelligible principle raises the question whether, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), Congress may attempt to assign article III courts the power to fashion federal common
law under circumstances that would require invalidating an otherwise identical grant of power to an
administrative agency. While delegations to the "least dangerous branch," in comparison with dele-
gations to the President, are less likely to threaten the structural integrity principle, the mere fact
that the congressional delegate is a judge presents no reason for abandoning the intelligible principle
requirement.
86. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-49 (1976).
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Hearing rights inhibit an agency's ability to evade responsibility and
force the agency to acknowledge those interests that might have opposed
congressional legislation.8 7 Commentators from a variety of perspectives
have identified these and other functions of due process and the nondele-
gation doctrine.8 8 The time has come to acknowledge the relationship
between the two doctrines, in the interests of enforcing the nondelegation
doctrine and of grounding the due process cases on a substantial consti-
tutional warrant.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. The "Protected Interest" Analysis.
Recognition of freedom from the illegitimate exercise of legislative
power as a protected liberty interest would extend due process scrutiny
to any exercise of official power over individuals by a congressional dele-
gate. This would render academic some of the more arbitrary distinc-
tions in the Court's "protected interest" cases. The tenured and
untenured employee alike would enjoy procedural protection against ter-
mination, except according to properly enacted legislative criteria.8 9 The
eerie contrast between transfer payment decisions concerning initial eligi-
bility and those regarding termination would become less stark.90 Under
the approach I suggest, the Court would retain some flexibility in review-
ing the procedures appropriate at different stages of the administrative
process, but would no longer need to allow the government limitless dis-
cretion over vital entitlement decisions.
My approach would not lead to any great increase in litigation. The
Court has already invited anyone suffering grievous loss to sue on due
process grounds, since the criteria defining protected'interests are vague
87. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing how delegation enables Congress
to avoid accountability).
88. See S. BARBER, supra note 18, at 30-34; Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 713, 730-33 (1969); Schoenbrod, supra note 45, at 1283-89; Stewart & Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1261-63 (1982). Professors Stewart and
Sunstein come close to endorsing the approach defended here, but they do not interpret the nondele-
gation doctrine as forbidding legislative definition of entitlements in procedural terms. Accordingly,
they apparently would require some other basis for imposing hearing rights when the legislature
manifests its intention to create entitlements in procedural terms.
Illuminatingly, Judge Easterbrook appears to agree that the nondelegation doctrine could sup-
port individual hearing rights. He rejects the possibility because he believes that "[t]he nondelega-
tion doctrine is a name without a doctrine." Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 118-19.
89. Cf Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.5 (1972) (no cause required for univer-
sity's failure to rehire nontenured employee, but cause required to fire tenured employee).
90. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970) (termination of welfare payments with-
out administrative hearing violates due process clause, but denial of same benefits to new applicants
without same hearing does not).
[Vol. 1988:657
NONDELEGA TION DOCTRINE
enough to give any such person hope, if not confidence, of success.91 Ju-
dicial restraint in imposing extrastatutory procedures could discourage
litigation at least as well as the vague protected interest requirement and
would avoid the ugly implication that some governmental decisions can
cause great hardship without any review for procedural fairness.
Recognizing a liberty interest based on the nondelegation doctrine
would not eliminate other protected interests, but it might enable the
Court to work out a more principled and coherent approach to their defi-
nition. For one thing, it would mean the end of the "new property"
approach. 92 But for the nondelegation doctrine, Congress could create
entitlements in procedural terms; therefore, aside from the liberty inter-
est that the nondelegation doctrine defines, no constitutional property
interest could arise from legislation containing procedures for defeasance
of the entitlements it creates.
Traditional jurisprudence recognizes certain liberty interests that
state governments can terminate only when they follow certain proce-
dures. For example, a state can impose criminal punishment only after
conducting a fair trial for violation of already existing law.93 If, as the
Supreme Court has held, the due process clause imposes on the states the
responsibility of justly compensating those from whom they take private
property for public use,94 it would seem that the fourteenth amendment
includes a constitutional definition of property. If property interests
arose only from state property law, it would be nonsense to talk of state
takings.95 Nonetheless, any constitutional definition of property, as the
takings example suggests, would necessarily defer to the myriad varia-
tions in state property law, and would be limited to interests the Court
was willing to require states to recognize as a substantive matter. Any
such definition would exclude state entitlement programs like the one at
issue in Goldberg. The logical force of the right/privilege distinction ex-
cludes the Goldberg holding as judicial usurpation of a legislative func-
91. In particular, under Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), informal assurances of tenure
may establish the existence of a property interest. The disgruntled probationary employee thus has
at least an open route to the jury, notwithstanding the threshold requirement of a protected interest.
92. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
93. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102 (1987) (upholding preventive detention
statute, but conceding " 'general rule' of substantive due process that the government may not detain
a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial"); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960) (guilty verdict supported by no evidence violates due process); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial violates due process); Johnson v. United States, 805 F.2d 1284,
1288 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("To punish a person criminally for an act that is not a crime would
seem the quintessence of denying due process of law.").
94. Chicago, B. & Q.RR. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
95. The point was not lost on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Court, which explic-
itly relied on a substantive, natural-law interpretation of "property." See id. at 231-41.
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tion. Accordingly, in the absence of a federal constitutional right to have
state legislative entitlements defined substantively rather than procedur-
ally,96 federal judicial scrutiny of state entitlement programs should all
but be eliminated.
B. The "Process Due" Analysis.
If my thesis is correct, every exercise of delegated article I powers
that inflicts injury would be subject to scrutiny under the fifth amend-
ment due process clause. Predicating this scrutiny on the nondelegation
doctrine would necessitate refinement of the balancing test that governs
the analysis of what process is due a protected interest. Under Mathews
v. Eldridge, the Court weighs the individual interest in avoiding errone-
ous deprivation, the government's interest in avoiding the cost of the pro-
cedure in question, and the contribution the procedure might make to
improving the quality of decisions. 97
Under the nondelegation approach, the courts will still face judg-
ments about the usefulness of possible procedural safeguards. Whether a
procedure protects property interests defined by current law, or freedom
from unfair procedures under article I, as I propose, courts can only re-
quire the procedure as a means to the end of enforcing the underlying
constitutional right.98
96. The most likely source for such a federal constitutional right is the guarantee clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. See J. ELY, supra note 27, at 240-41 n.78 (arguing that guarantee clause
imposes nondelegation doctrine on the states); Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government:
Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 208, 232-35 (1987) (same). The guarantee clause,
however, remains unenforceable under the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 209-37 (1962). The apportionment decisions, purportedly based on the equal protection clause,
see id. at 226; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), may imply a different conclusion. See Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
70-72 (1988) (dicta in apportionment cases suggest justiciability of some guarantee clause cases).
These decisions arguably indicate that the guarantee clause is alive and well but living under an
assumed name. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The present case involves
all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases non-justiciable. It is, in effect a
Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label."). Perhaps Goldberg and its progeny
reflect the same masquerade. The Court should either unveil the living guarantee clause, or get out
of the business of policing the enforcement of state statutes.
97. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976); supra note 6, 11 and accompanying
text.
98. This would do no more than deny openly what current law denies implicitly-a constitu-
tional right to procedure for its own sake. If a factual dispute about the applicability of a valid rule
is a precondition for a hearing, see infra note 105, then the Constitution commands process only
when process has some chance of preventing the misapplication of some other legal norm. With
respect to federal tribunals, the delegation approach would authorize judicial scrutiny of procedures
leading to individual injury, without the fiction of making up a new constitutional value. See Easter-
brook, supra note 69, at 115-18 (justly disparaging dignitary theories).
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The nature of the underlying right will still affect the analysis by
determining the clarity of congressional policy required under the
nondelegation doctrine. A relatively vague delegation may withstand
scrutiny if the power delegated governs commercial activity.99 This is
not to disparage property rights but only to admit their secondary impor-
tance to rights to life and liberty. The hierarchy of judicial value, with
the exercise of political freedoms and the maintenance of life itself at the
apex, will appear in delegation cases just as it has in due process cases.
The difference under my proposal would be that courts would mea-
sure the sufficiency of legislative procedures against the goal of nondele-
gation, rather than against the goal of protecting some other interest.
Thus, in a rulemaking proceeding pursuant to a statutory delegation
presenting a close case on the intelligible principle requirement, extensive
procedures might be required to find the elusive congressional mandate.
In an adjudicatory proceeding brought under such a statute (in the ab-
sence of clarifying regulations), similar considerations would apply.
In general, the Supreme Court has declined to scrutinize rulemaking
procedures very rigorously. 100 Two venerable but vital decisions,
99. See Schoenbrod, supra note 45, at 1285. Professor Schoenbrod criticizes the Court's prac-
tice of policing delegations implicating liberty more rigorously than it policies delegations implicat-
ing property. But no procedure can make absolutely certain that the congressional agent has acted
as Congress would have acted in its place. The risk of error that is constitutionally tolerable is not
the same in every case with constitutional rights at stake. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Re-
view, 85 COLUM. L. RFv. 229, 267-68 (1985). Thus, not all potential constitutional violations de-
serve equally effective preventive procedures. Indeed, not all violations even of the same
constitutional provision are of equal concern. For example, an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to recover damages inflicted by a
search executed in good-faith reliance on a warrant and an action for damages inflicted by unreason-
ably shooting dead a fleeing suspect are both grounded on the fourth amendment. The two suits,
however, have radically different chances of success. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985) (use of deadly force by police officer to seize a felon violates fourth amendment unless neces-
sary to prevent escape and officer has probable cause to perceive danger) with Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) (police officer whose request for warrant caused unconstitutional arrest will
be immune from liability unless the "warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence unreasonable"). Just as the remedy required for violations of
the fourth amendment turns in part on the degree to which particular state practices offend the
values protected by the amendment, the procedures required to protect the liberty from official in-
jury unauthorized by Congress vary with the importance of the policy choice that a litigant claims
Congress failed to make. I agree with Professor Freedman that the generality with which Congress
may delegate declines as the constitutional competence of Congress with respect to the subject mat-
ter increases. See Freedman, supra note 48, at 326-31. As noted supra at note 48, I disagree with
the notion that Congress might delegate some article I powers without anything in the way of an
intelligible principle. Cf Freedman, supra note 48, at 331-35. If these conclusions are correct, the
courts might properly vary procedural safeguards depending on the consequences attending the mis-
taken exercise of delegated power.
100. See generally Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282-85
(1984) (individuals have no constitutional right to speak to public bodies making policy decisions).
The Supreme Court also has rebuffed attempts by the United States Courts of Appeals to impose
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Londoner v. City & County of Denver 101 and Bi-Metallic Investment
Board v. State Board of Equalization, 102 illustrate the Court's approach.
In Londoner, a local board assessed the property of the residents of a
single street; the assessment was nof reviewable by the state courts. The
Supreme Court held that "where the legislature... , instead of fixing the
tax itself, commits to some subordinate body the duty of determining
whether, in what amount, and upon whom it shall be levied, . . . due
process of law requires that at some stage of the proceedings ... the
taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard." 10 3 In Bi-Metallic, a
state agency ordered an across-the-board increase in the assessed valua-
tion of all the property in Denver. Unlike the ruling in Londoner, this
determination was reviewable in the state courts. Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes refused to recognize an individual right to be heard.
When individuals suffer from general statutes, "[t]heir rights are pro-
tected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." 104
The Bi-Metallic Court's distinction, based on the impracticality of
providing hearing rights for a large number of individuals, is wide of the
mark. Individual hearing rights in this context are not so much imprac-
tical as they are redundant; the case on behalf of each victim of a general
deprivation is the same. A legislatively made rule involves no delegation;
when a delegate makes the rule, however, due process requires that the
proceeding be designed to conform the result to the legislative policy
determination.
One procedural safeguard required in administrative proceedings
might be the availability of judicial review, a more relevant distinction
between Londoner and Bi-Metallic than the number of individuals af-
fected by the rulings.105 Another safeguard would be prepublication of
procedures on agency rulemaking beyond those mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
The Court's position notwithstanding, rulemaking proceedings can work the same deprivation
as an adjudication. See, e.g., Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1167-69 (2d
Cir. 1973); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). In both cases, a general ratemaking
proceeding led to rent increases for subsidized housing beneficiaries. The courts concluded that due
process did not require adversary procedures in the rulemaking context, but reached this conclusion
under the "process due" inquiry, after the litigants established a "protected interest." See also Note,
Welfare, Due Process, and "Brutal Need'" The Requirement of A Prior Hearing in State- Wide Bene-
fit Reductions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 173, 195-208 (1981) (surveying decisions requiring hearings when
legislative rules reduce welfare benefits).
101. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
102. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
103. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385.
104. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
105. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agency action is not reviewable in court if stat-
utes preclude review or if the matter is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)
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proposed rules to give a representative of the affected individuals' inter-
ests an opportunity to be heard. But once the agency has promulgated a
valid rule, hearings are required only to the extent that individuals con-
test the applicability of the rule to their particular cases.10 6
The Administrative Procedure Act obviates most due process chal-
lenges to administrative rules at the federal level. Its notice-and-com-
ment procedure ensures that interested persons have an opportunity to
submit their views to delegates of congressional power.10 7 If an agency
interprets its statutory mandate arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts
have authority to set the interpretation aside.108 It is most unlikely that
an agency could comply with the notice-and-comment procedures while
denying an opportunity to be heard to representative members of the
class adversely affected, and yet produce a decision that could survive
review under the "hard look" doctrine.10 9
The most significant departure from current federal practice that the
nondelegation approach might bring about would be a restriction of
agencies' ability to make policy in the adjudicatory context. Currently,
these agencies can make policy either by promulgating rules or by adjudi-
cating. 110 If the nondelegation doctrine implied procedural rights, the
(1982). If my thesis is correct, the nondelegation doctrine makes it unconstitutional for Congress to
commit the exercise of legislative power entirely to agency discretion. Statutory preclusion of review
might then render the delegation of legislative power unconstitutional, because no satisfactory
method would limit the agency to its congressional mission. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legisla-
tive powers broadly-and courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercise the delegated power within statutory limits .... ) (footnote omitted),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). But the nondelegation doctrine could support a constitutional
right to review only when courts might make a meaningful contribution to enforcing the will of
Congress. Thus, the exception for "matters committed to agency discretion" should be thought of
not as applying when "there is no law to apply," but rather as applying when the congressional
delegate is more likely than the federal courts to correctly identify the law enacted by Congress.
Recent cases such as Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (denying review of an administrative
decision to forgo prosecution) and Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988) (denying review of statu-
tory, but not constitutional, challenges to personnel decisions of the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency) are rare exceptions in which review would make no contribution to ensuring
compliance with congressional standards for the exercise of delegated power. The executive nature
of the power at issue in Heckler might also explain that case.
106. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam) (no due process hearing required
when plaintiff fails to allege factual error by administrator); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (no right to adjudicatory hearing for party who admits violation of
valid rule).
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
108. Id. § 706(2)(a). For an example of substantive review of agency rulemaking, see Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
109. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 40-44.
110. See, eg., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("[Ihe Board is not
precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and ... the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion.").
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courts would then have a constitutional ground for requiring agencies to
employ procedures calculated to produce the results intended by Con-
gress. When operating under a general or vague statutory delegation,
agencies would be able to make new policy only by rulemaking, not
adjudication.11
By contrast, if the governing statute is clear, or an adjudication is
governed by previously upheld rules clarifying the delegation, the need to
protect liberty from the unauthorized exercise of legislative power would
diminish. The need could never wholly vanish, though, for arbitrary fac-
tual findings could subvert any formal rule, however clear.1 12 The differ-
ence between nondelegation-based scrutiny and the Mathews approach
would therefore be one only of degree, but this would nevertheless be a
real difference.
CONCLUSION
I have proposed reliance on the nondelegation doctrine as a response
to the logical problem posed by the right/privilege distinction and the
Supreme Court's procedural due process cases. The delegation connec-
tion offers a principled basis for the Court's decisions, insofar as those
decisions affirm a judicial obligation to confine the exercise of federal
legislative power according to the constitutional rules of validity set out
in article I. In contrast, the nondelegation doctrine fails to justify consti-
tutional procedural requirements for state entitlement programs. 113 Ab-
sent a substantive constitutional right for such procedures to protect, the
procedural due process cases involving state entitlement programs have
no plausible justification.
111. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-96 (1969); H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS 25 (1962).
112. See Monaghan, supra note 99, at 272-73; see, eg., ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 227
U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
113. See Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Constitu-
tional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 340-41 (1987) ("Procedural due process applies to state and
local governments, but no federal constitutional concern, except perhaps the non-justiciable Guar-
anty Clause, governs ultra vires state and local administrative action.") (footnote omitted).
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